Ordinarily an heir appointed under the customary law does not succeed to the property of his natural father in the presence of his natural brothers, though he can succeed collaterally in the family of his natural father, even in the presence of his natural brothers. As observed by Shadi Lal C. J., in Jagat Singh v. Ishar Singh (I)-" It is clear that the appointed 'heir does not cease to be a member of his natural family and does not lose his right of succession in that family. His appointment as an heir, however, confers upon him the right of succeeding to the estate of his adoptive father; and it was, therefore, considered unjust that he should be allowed to compete with his natura1 brothers in the matter of succession to the estate of his natural father. Equity and justice demand that he should not succeed to the property of his natural father in the presence of his natural brothers and an exception was grafted on the general rule, allowing him to succeed in his natural family.
"The principle mentioned above has, however, no application to the case of a succession to the estate of a collateral in the natural family because it is common ground that the appointed heir has no right of succession to the collateral relatives of the appointer. Neither the nature of the relationship created by the appointment of an heir, nor the rule of justice can be involved to support the contention that the appointed heir, who does not succeed to the estate of the collateral relatives of the appointer. should also be deprived of his right of succession to a collateral in the natural family, merely because he has got his natural brothers in that family."
Abdul Qadir, J. observed in the same case-"it is recognized as a general rule that an appointed heir does not altogether sever his re1ations with his natural family and is not completely transplanted into the family c of his adoptive father. He retains the right to succeed the property of this natural father as against collaterals. However, as It was presumably that it would give him an undue advantage over his brothers if he succeeded to the property of his adoptive father, as well as to that of his natural father in the presence of his brothers, an exception was made in the favour of his brothers, but the exception was probably meant to be confined to the property inherited from the natural father because his collateral succession rests on a different footing. For that purpose he has ordinarily no status in the family of the adoptive father and he cannot succeed collaterally in the latter family,"
In Situ v. Kanshi Ram (2), one Phanun had three sons, Dulla, Gangu and Tirbu. Tirhu was appointed heir to his uncle Gurmukh. As a result of this he succeeded to the property of his uncle Gurmukh. but was excluded from any share in the estate of his natural father Phanun. Dulla and Gangu succeeded in equal shares to that estate. Gangu died and his son Brij Lal also died leaving two sons Kanshi and Rikhia, the plaintiffs in the suit. Dulla died without issue leaving a widow Mst. Radhan. When Mst. Radhan died the revenue authorities mutated the land of Dulla half to the plaintiffs and half to Tirhu. Tirhu died shortly afterwards, and the plaintiffs brought a suit against Situ and Khazana, sons of Tirhu, the defendants in the suit alleging that they alone were entitled to succeed to the property of Dulla. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit holding that the defendants were not the reversionary heirs of Mst. Radhan deceased. The District Judge dismissed the appeal, holding that the rule which excludes an appointed heir from succession to his natural father in the presence of his brothers logically excludes him from succession on the death of one of his brothers if another brother or his descendants are alive. Held, on further appeal, that the plaintiffs did not succeed in proving that they excluded Tirhu or his descendants from succession to estate of Dulla. It was remarked-"It is clear enough that the relation of an appointed heir and his adoptive father is purely a personal one and the exclusion of the appointed heir from succession to his natural father's estate must be regarded as an exception and should not be interpreted to mean that he js excluded altogether from the family."
On Letters Patent appeal (l),however, it was held that as the adopted son could not succeed collaterally in the family of his adoptive father, he was allowed to succeed collaterally in the family of his natural father' that an adopted son was not entitled to succeed to his share in his natural father's property in the presence of his natural brother; that the property of a person who died issueless first reverted to the ancestor who left an issue and then descended to his lineal descendants; and that therefore an adopted son did not succeed to the estate of his natural brother who died without leaving any issue when the descendants of another were living..
It was observed in Sita Ram v. Raja Ram (2)-" The general principle which regulates succession to ancestral land in a Punjab village community is fully explained in 4 P. R. 1891. It is there shown that the property of a man who dies without issue first reverts to the ancestor and then descends to the male lineal descendants of that ancestor. Thus a brother succeeds a sonless brother not as a brother but because the estate reverts to the father and descends again to his sons. So too a mother succeeds not as mother but as the widow of the father to whom the estate has ascended. This also explains what is called 'the principle of representation.' Appointing this rule to the case of adopted sons or donees who have left no lineal heirs, it is clear that the estate would be treated as ascending to the person from whom the adopted son or donee derived his title; if, as would almost invariably be the case, that person left no male lineal descendants, the estate would ascend still higher in his line until an ancestor was found who had held the estate and had left descendants. I think that there can be no doubt that the principle laid down in 4 P.R. 1891 is the true principle of succession, and under it the persons called, in the cases before us, the collaterals of the donor or adopter have an undoubted right to succeed in preference to the collaterals of the donee, or an adopted son, who have really no right of succession at all."
It was held in Ishar v. Hukam -Singh (1) by Moti Sagar, J., sitting in Single Bench, that in the case of a customary appointment of an heir the descendants of an adopted son who has succeeded to the property of his adoptive father,-retain their rights of succession in the natural family of the appointee in the presence of and along with the other descendants of the appointee's natural family. The decision was however reversed on Letters Patent appeal (2), where it was held that the descendants of an adopted Son had no right to succeed to a share in the estate of natural father's family as against the descendants of his natural brothers. In such cases the property, which had descended from the natural father to his sons, other than the one who had been "adopted" elsewhere, is on one of such sons dying childless, treated as that of the natural father and follows the same course of devolution as it would have done on the death of the natural father.
In Chajju v. Dalipa (3), a case relating is Mahtolts of Jullundur District, it was held that the sons of an appointed heir who predeceased his adoptive father were entitled to succeed on the latter's death to his estate. It was observed that there was no real distinction between an adoption and gift, the intention of the alienor being the same in both, and that there can be no question that a gift, if valid, would benefit the donee's sons whether the donee himself predeceased the donor or not. It was also remarked-"An element of absurdity is brought into the matter. if the ultimate effeetiveness of the appointment is made to depend on the accident whether the appointer or appointed should die first."
Chajju v. Dalipa (3) was followed in Jhanda Singh v. Kesar Singh (4). In this case one Jodh Singh ad Jpted Chaughatta and Kesar Singh, who was the natural son of Chaughatta, was born after his natural father held been adopted by Jodh Singh. Chaughatta died during the life-time of Jodh Singh. Rattigan, J. remarked-"It appears to me that on general principles Kesar Singh would in any event have been entitled to succeed to the property of Jonh Singh, even though his father (the adopted son of Jodh Singh) had died in the life-time of the latter."
Chajju v. Dalipa (3) was, however, overruled by a Full Bench in Mela Singh v. Gurdas (5) and it was held that in the absence of a special custom to the contrary, the son of an appointed heir who predeceased the appointer is not entitled to succeed to the property of the latter. "In the absence of a special custom to the contrary, the son of an appointed heir acquires no right of inheritance to the appointer per Shadi Lal, C. J.
Mela Singh v. Gurdas (5) was distinguished in Jodh Singh v. Mahla (6) in which it was held that where by a will the testator bequeathed his property to his adopted son subject to the life-interest of his' widow and the adopted son died during the widow's life-time leaving behind him a son, a heritable vested interest was created in favour of the legatee on the testator's death and his son was the rightful successor to the property after widow's death. It was remarked-"The principle laid down in Mela Singh v. Gurdas (5), does not affect the plaintiff's right, his father having as the appointed heir survived the appointer.
In Mutsaddi Singh v. Narain (1) it was observed-"The parties are Jata of Tahsil Jagraon, Ludhiana District, and the sole question before us is, whether an appointed heir is entitled by custom to succeed collaterally to property left by the nephew of the person who appointed him heir in the presence and to the prejudice of the collateral heirs of the deceased. The general rule, no doubt, is that an appointed heir does not succeed collaterally in the family of the person who appointed him such heir and the reason for this rule is presumably the other rule, also of almost universal applicability throughout the Province, that a person who has been appointed heir in one family does not lose his right of succession collaterally in the family of his natural father. It may well be therefore that in cases where custom does not recognize the latter rule, that is to say, where the appointed heir loses all right of collateral succession in his own natural family, that custom would recognize his right to collateral succession in the family of the person who appojnted him heir."
See also Jagat Singh v. lshwar Singh (2) and Kanshi Ram v. Situ (3) quoted above.
The onus of proving that adopted son can succeed collaterally in his adoptive family, is on the assertor (4).
There is practically no analogy between the customary appointment of an heir in the Punjab and the Dattaka form of adoption in Hindu Law with all its restrictions and limitations as to relationship and age and its attendant religious and secular ceremonies. But in certain tribes in the Punjab governed by custom there is a complete adoption having the effect of severing the connection of the boy with his natural family. There the intention to make a complete change of family is always manifested and the adoption is said to be 'formal.'
As already pointed out, the institution of adoption occupies a unique place under Hindu Law. It severs the adopted son from the family of his birth, transplants him into the adoptive family and puts him on the same footing as a son born in the latter family. A mere customary adoption does not involve the transplanting of the heir from one family to another but where a son is formally adopted and there is manifestation of intention to make a complete change of family, the position is different from mere appointment of an heir.
Some agricultural tribes in certain places have been found to be governed by a special custom under which adoption does not amount to mere appointment of an heir but has attached to it all the consequences which flow from a full and formal adoption of the Hindu law. Where such a special custom is found to exist it is not necessary for the adoption to have this result, that it should take place in conformity with the rules of Hindu Law in the matter of ritual or otherwise. It is quite enough if the adoption conforms to that custom in the matter of form and otherwise. One of the essential effects of an adoption involving a complete transplantation of the adoptee from one family to the other is to confer on the adoptee the right of collateral succession in the adoptive family and to take away the right of such succession in his natural family. There is no standard of' formality and no precise customary rules as to what is to be done to produce all the effects of a full adoption, and where the adoption is as complete as customary adoption ever is and where the intention to make a complete change of the family is manifest, the right or collateral succession may be presumed .The position is the same in a case where the custom governing the adopter by itself attaches such consequences' to the adoption without it being necessary for him to manifest any intention to clothe the adoption with such results, Where such a custom is proved the adoptee must be held to be a descendant of the common ancestor in the adopting family and any property coming down from the said ancestor in the ordinary course of inheritance to which the aforesaid adoptee succeeded by way of collateral succession must be held to be ancestral in his hands qua his sons (1).
Under the Hindu Law, it is only in the case of an adoption taking place in the Dattaka form that the adopted son has the right of collateral succession ; an adopted son who is adopted in the Kritrima form ordinarily succeeds only to the estate of his adoptive father as the relationship between the two is a purely personal one, ‘whether the adoption in question is treated as a Punjab Customary adoption or as a Kritrima -adoption, in both cases there is no change in the adopted son's family and no relationship with the adoptive father's collateral relation is established, Per Shah Din, J. (2).
Where under the customary law adoption is complete inasmuch as the intention to make a complete change of family is manifested, there the right of collateral succession in adoptive family may be presumed till the contrary is shown (3). It has been held in Lachman Das v, Amrik Singh (4) that an adopted son of a childless Randhawa Jat of village Khunda, in the Tahsil and District Gurdaspur, who has been formally adopted, can succeed collaterally in the adoptive family.
The main test of a formal adoption under custom is the intention to take out the boy out of his natural family and introduce him into the adopter's family as his natural son (s).
Where the intention to make a complete change of family is manifested, the right of collateral succession may be presumed to exist till the contrary is shown (6), It was observed in this case-"There is no doubt a sense in which all Jat adoptions may be said to be in- formal." Where the parties were not governed by the Hindu Law books (which gave names to different kinds of adoption, and prescribed certain condition regarding age, relationship and religious and social ceremonies), and where they adopted in a different way, as well Jats do, the adoption is, qua the Hindu Law-books 'informal.' But. there can also be no doubt that passages may be quoted in which even among such adoptions as Jats practise, a distinction may be drawn between those that are 'formal' and those that are informal,' For instance where the child is taken at an early age the brotherhood assembled, sugar distributed, and when after the child is brought up and treated as a son of the house, betrothed, married and associated in the cultivation, and allowed to perform the funeral ceremonies then the adoption is normal,' Whereas in other cases a person is only acknowledged later in life, and perhaps there was only a deed which is very like a gift-deed, or a will, and none of the above-mentioned circumstances occur, in such cases the adopted son is virtually a mere donee or appointed heir, and the adoption is 'informal.' .
In the Old Delhi territory (comprising the Districts of Hissar, Rohtak, Kamal and Gurgaon), an adoption even among agricultural tribes under the customary law is not the mere customary appointment of an heir as understood in the rest of the Punjab, but it is a full and 'formal' adoption having the same effect as in Hindu Law. In this territory adoption, when effected, is of a formal nature and not the mere customary appointment of an heir as is usually met with in the Punjab proper; and the adopted son merges in his new family. The presumption for this territory is that adoption is a 'formal' one. The presumption is, however, rebuttable, and it may be shown by evidence that the adoption (even in these districts) was not a "formal" one, but the mere customary appointment of an heir generally prevalent In the districts of the Central Punjab (1),
In Karnal and apparently in the Delhi territory generally, the Hindu conception of adoption prevails and an adopted son is regarded as completely severed from his natural family (2). As regards adoption only two forms are known in the Punjab, viz., adoption amongst agriculturists of the greater part of the Province, which is, strictly speaking, not an adoption but merely the customary appointment of an heir, and adoption under Hindu Law as practiced in the south-east part of the Punjab (3).
Although an heir appointed under the Customary Law of the Punjab does not ordinarily lose his right to succeed to property in his natural family, still in Karnal and Rohtak Districts in common with other parts of the old Delhi territory the Hindu contention of adoption prevails and the adopted son loses all claim to his natural father's estate (4),
In the districts comprised in the old Delhi territory, the Hindu conception of an adoption prevails, the adopted son being completely severed from his natural family and becoming a member of the adoptive family and entitled as such (inter alia) to succeed collaterally in the family of his adoptive father, or to succeed to occupancy rights as the "male lineal descendants" of his adoptive father, within the meaning of Sec. 59 of the Punjab Tenancy Act (1). In this tract of the Punjab, the adopted son is transplanted from his natural father's family to the family of the adopter and has all the rights of a Dattaka son under the Mitakshara Law.
It is, however, not necessary that the adoption should take place with all the formalities laid down and the conditions imposed by the Mitakshara Law. Indeed, in this territory as elsewhere in the Punjab, strict Hindu Law has been modified by custom so as to permit, for instance the adoption of a daughter's son (2). '
In the Hissar District, which is pal t of. the old Delhi territory, an adoption under Customary Law is not he appointment of an heir as understood in the Punjab but is a full adoption having the same effect as in Hindu Law, though all the essentials for a valid. adoption required in Hindu Law need not exist m the customary adoption (3). The adoption which prevails in the Districts comprised in the old Delhi territory, namely, Hissar, Rohtak, Kamal, is in effect of the nature of a formal adoption under Hindu Law. An adopted Son of a brother is therefore entitled to succeed collaterally to his uncle's property (4). A custom of collateral succession in adoptive father's family. By adopted son or his heirs, exists among Jats of the Rohtak District (5}.
It was observed in Waryam Singh v. Ishar (6)-" An appointed heir under the Punjab Customary Law has practically the rights as a son adopted under Hindu Law. There are minor distinctions, however, for example as regards collateral succession. A, other difference is that if the appointed heir dies sonless, and leaves no widow, the estate which he inherited from the appointer passes to his own natural heirs if it consists of property over which the appointer had an absolute power of disposal, but it passes to the male collaterals of the appointer family if the estate consists of property over which the appointer had only a restricted power (para. 55 of Rattigan's Digest). This simply means that if the appointed heir has no male issue, the self-acquired property of his adoptive father goes to the appointed heirs, while the ancestral property of the appointer goes back to the appointer’s family. Further, if a natural son is born after appointment of an heir, the appointed heir succeeds equally with such subsequently born natural son (S. 52 ibid). This shows that the position of an appointed heir is for most purposes that of a son or an adopt son.
The position of an appointed heir under the Punjab Customary Law is materially different from the position of a son adopted under the Hindu Law. In the former case, only a personal relationship is established between the appointed heir and the appointer. There is no transplantation of the adopted son from his natural family into the family of his adoptive father.
Moreover, an appointment of an heir only affects the parties thereto. The appointed heir does not become the grandson of the appointer's father and his ion does not become the grandson of the appointer. The appointed heir does. not succeed collaterally to the estate of the appointer's relatives (1).
Under the Punjab Customary Law there is only one difference between the appointment of an heir (adoption) and a gift and that is that whereas in the latter case the property passes immediately to the donee, in the former the property does not vest in the appointed heir till the death of the adoptive father. Succession to an appointed heir is governed by the same principles as those which govern succession to a donee. Where on the death of the appointed heir his widow took possession. of his property on the usual life tenure and gifted the property to her daughter. the gift merely amounts to an acceleration of succession and the agnatic theory cannot be stretched so far as to lay down that the collaterals of the adoptive father would be entitled to exclude the daughter of the adopted son (1).
Answers to Questions Nos. 62 and 63.
"1887.-The replies given differ widely, and in some cases the question was altogether misunderstood. There is no definite custom, but the general rule is that descendants of a common grandfather will always exclude the adopted son in inheritance from his natural father. Failing these near collaterals, the adopted son will generally succeed his natural father. The case, however, rarely arises as an adoption always in the opinion of the people should be, and generally is, from among the near collaterals. At attestation, Rajputs, Jats, Gujjars, Sayyads, Rors and Kambohs all agreed to the rule as stated above, while the Rains contented themselves with saying that adoption was too rare an occurrence for them to give a distinct reply.
1918.- The general custom is against the adopted son succeeding to the property of his natural father but there seems to be no reason why he should not succeed to a share in his capacity of collateral through his adoptive father.
The issue is confused because there is often no clear cut distinction between adoption and gift. that is to say, an-adopted son may be merely the person on whom an issueless proprietor has decided to bestow his propertyand the so-called adoption may amount to nothing more.
1887.- The universal reply is that the adopted son ranks precisely as a natural son (of the adoptive father) and shares equally with other natural sons (of the adoptive father) born after the adoption. The Kharar Rajputs quote cases exactly in point.
A. I . R. 1945- In Punjab among the Rajputs of Ambala
Lah. 229 (F. B.) district a person appointed as an heir to a
= 47 P. L. R. 373 third person does not thereby lose his right to
-221 I. C. 305 succeed to the property of his natural father.
A corollary to this general rule is that the appointed heir and his lineal descendants have no right to succeed to the property of the appointed heir's natural father against the other sons of the natural father and their descendants. The appointed heir can succeed to the property of his natural father when the only other claimant is the collateral heir of the latter.
29 P. R. 189S-- Sarsut Brahmans of Ambala District. The plaintiff failed to show any custom entitling him to succeed collaterally as the adopted son, to property left by the brother of his adoptive father, to the- exclusion of the latter's daughter.
Answers to Questions Nos. 89 to 91.-
As in 1865, all the tribes, with the exception of Brahmans and Khatris, answered that in adopted son does not retain his right to inherit from his natural father, even if the latter dies without leaving other sons. Some persons make an exception in favour of the adopted son. Who is an only son of his natural father, and one instance of Sidhu Jats of Atari is quoted.
An adopted son inherits exactly in the same way as a natural son. He will share as a son with legitimate sons born to the adoptive father subsequently to the adoption. Where the chundavand rule prevails the tribes state that he win get a share equal to that of one son, but no such case is known ever to have occurred. An adopted son is usually of the same tribe as the adoptive father. But, if a person of different tribe is validly adopted, he will inherit exactly as if he was of the same tribe with his adoptive father.
All the tribes state that an adopted Son succeeds collaterally in the family of his adoptive father. with the exception of Brahmans and Khatris of Meahta, who say that he does not do so. The rule defined by the courts, however, is that an adopted son has no right to succeed in this manner. The latest ruling on this point is P. R. 107 of 1911 in which it was held that among Jat Sikhs of the Tarn Taran Tahsil an adopted son, appointed by the usual customary method, does not succeed to collaterals as this adoptive father's representative."
Right of the adopted son to inherit in his natural family recognized.
A. I. R. 1933 Lah. 1050- Khatris of Amritsar. Adoption according to the Dattaka form as understood under the Mitakshara Law. with the slight variation which enables a daughter's son to be adopted according to the local custom prevailing among them. Consequently, the adopted boy is debarred from claiming any share in the family of his natural father.
43 P. R. 1879- Jats of Mauza Tira Kalan. Ajnala Tahsil. An only son was adopted by his uncle according to the customary rule. Held. that the adopted son was not thus deprived of his right of succession in: his natural family in the absence of proof of custom to that effect.
80 P. L. R. 1906- An adoption with customary ceremonies confers
=4 P. W. R. 1908 on an adopted son the right to succeed to the estate of his adoptive father’s father though his adoptive father died in the life-time of his father and did not succeed to the estate from him.
Right to succeed collaterally in the family of adoptive father not recognized.
61 P. R. 1894- Sohel Jats of Amritsar District. A non. Agnate who was adopted failed to establish his right to succeed collaterally in the family of his adoptive father. There is a distinction between persons who are, and those who are not. of the same got or genealogical family as the. adopter, and it by no means follows that even tf a non-agnate can be and has been validly adopted. he is capable of inheriting collaterally. while an agnate being of the same got as deceased may be so' capable. either in his own right as a collateral or in his right as adopted son. '
14 P. R. l884- Gil Jats of Tahsil Ajnala. The mere appointment of an heir does not give any right to the appointed heir to succeed to the collaterals of the adoptive father. He has got the right to succeed if incorporated in the adoptive father's family."
107 P. R. 1913- Sikh Jatsof Tarn Taran Tahsil. An heir appointed under the Customary Law does not acquire a right to succeed to the collaterals of his adoptive father. Adoptee in this case was a great-nephew of the adopter.
* Answers to Questions Nos. 89 to 91.-
An adopted son loses his right to inherit as son from his natural father, and succeeds to his adoptive father. An adopted son inherits from his adoptive father exactly as if he were a natural son. He will share as a son with natural legitimate sons subsequently born to the adoptive father. No instance is known of natural legitimate sons having been born subsequently to the adoption where the chundavand system of inheritance prevails, but the unanimous opinion is that the natural son and the adopted son would share alike (pagvand).
"An adopted son has exactly the same rights as a natural son in the new family, when once he has been adopted. He may, therefore, succeed collaterally in his adoptive father's family. His rights in the family in which he was born are entirely extinguished by the adoption.
Note.-The custom is the same in Gurgaon and Rohtak Districts, vide Tupper's Customary Law, Volume II, pages 157, 178, 179. The custom was maintained in Civil Appeal No. 40 of 1910 in the Court of the Additional Divisional Judge which was based on an examination of mutation registers."
DERA GHAZI KHAN DISTRICT
* Answers to Questions Nos. 62 and 63.
"The Hindus of Dera and Rajanpur Tehsils, who alone admit the custom, say that an adopted son is entitled to succeed to his natural father's estate even if the latter have other lineal male issue.
Among the Hindus of the Dera and Rajanpur Tahsils, who alone recognize adoption, the adopted son is treated in all circumstances as a natural son, and shares usually with the natural sons born either before or after the adoption."
DERA ISMAIL KHAN DISTRICT
** Answers to Questions Nos. 13 and 14, Section VI.-
An adopted son cannot inherit his natural father's property when the latter leaves other sons. If, however, he dies without male issue, the adopted son retains his right to inherit from his natural father. If natural sons are born afterwards (to adoptive father), they and the adoptive son share alike."
***Answers to Questions Nos. 76 and 77.
All agree that the adopted son cannot inherit from his natural father. except as far as regards such share of the property as would come to his adoptive father as a collateral. Sodhis however say that ho can inherit his natural father's estate if the latter has no male descendants, while the Nipals say the adopted son inherits from both fathers. An adopted son has exactly the same rights of inheritance from his adoptive father as a natural legitimate son. The inheritance would only be by chundavand, if that was the prevalent rule of the family. The Nipals, Rajputs, Arains, Moghals, Sayyads, Gujjars and takes the got of his adoptive father; while if he is of a different tribe, Muhammadan Jats state that if the adopted son is of a different got, he cannot inherit."
Note.-Most tribes of course insist that the adopted son must be a collateral and thus naturally of doe same got as the adoptive father.
Right of an adopted son to inherit in his natural family.
45 P. R. 1884- Gil Jats of Moga Tahsil. By custom an appointed heir dot's not forfeit his right to succeed as heir to the estate left by his nephews (brother's sons) along with other nephews (sons of another brother). Non-succession to natural father raises no adverse presumption.
A, Band C were brothers. A had three sons D, E and F. F was adopted by B; C and E died childless. In question of succession to E, held F'B sons succeeded equally with D's.
68 P. R.1898- Muhammadans of Ferozepur District. An adopted son and his descendants succeed in the natural family of the adopted son.
45 P. R. 1916- Banias of Tahsil Muktsar. An appointed heir retains his right to succeed in his natural family as against collaterals, though he does not succeed in presence of his natural brothers.
Right to succeed in natural family not recognized.
51 P. R. l867- Agriculturists of Ferozepur District, the adoptee being brother's grandson of adopter.
72 P. R. 1893- Gil Jats, Moga Tahsil. By custom the estate of a proprietor dying without male issue whose father was an adopted son, devolved upon the heirs of the adoptive father and not upon the natural heirs of the adopted son. The general presumption was against the right of the collateral heirs in the natural line to succeed to the property which the deceased and his father inherited by virtue of the adoption, which was a customary appointment of an heir common among agriculturist Jats of the Province.
103 P. R. 1909- Sikh Jats of Mauza Chubarchak. By custom, an adopted son of the same got as the adoptive father, is entitled to succeed collaterally in the family of his adoptive father. An adopted son is transferred into the family of the adoptive father, and he would, therefore, be debarred by custom, irrespective of his consent, from inheriting in his natural father's family in his capacity as a natural son.
Right to succeed collaterally in adoptive family recognized.
103 P. R. 1909- Sikh Jats of Mauza Chubarchak. In this case there was complete transfer to the adoptive family.