Answer to Question No. 69.-
"The Jats generally say that a woman can only adopt with the permission of her husband; some say that this permission must be in writing but most hold that verbal permission given before the panchayat is sufficient. The Bagri Jats, Kumhars, Suthars and the Bishnois say that in default of written permission the consent of the collaterals is necessary. Sodhis and Mahotams and the Mohammedan tribes say that a woman cannot adopt without the written permission of her husband. The Nipals say she cannot adopt. Practically the custom is that a widow has no power of adoption except where her husband has expressly empowered her to adopt."
77 P. R. 1888- Gil1 Jats. A widow adopted a daughter's son to her late husband. The next reversioner assented to that adoption. The remote reversioners are not bound by that consent, as they do not claim the estate through the next reversioners, but as heir of the widow's husband.
178 P. R. 1888- Mauza Khai. The widow of a proprietor adopted a descendant of the paternal aunt of the deceased. Held, that pattidars had no right to object to this adoption.
* Answer to Question No. 66.-
"All tribes admitting adoption
A woman cannot adopt in her husband's life-time. A widow can adopt only with the written permission or her husband, secured in his life-time, or with the consent of his co1laterals. Tahsil Wazirabad tribes and Arains (Tahsil Sharakpur) assert further that even with the oral permission of her husband, if attested, she can adopt.
** Answer to Question N°. 95.-
"All tribes who have a right to adopt say a woman whose husband is alive cannot adopt. On the death of her husband she can do so with the consent of her husband's col1aterals. The consent may be in writing or orally. If she has got a written permission of her husband no consent of the collatera1s is needed though some persons say even in that case the collateral's consent is necessary but no such practice is found."
Answer to Question No.5, Section 11.-
"All the tribes deny the woman's right of adoption."
196 P. L. R. 1911- Pathans of village Kala Afghanan, Batala Tahsil.
= 14 I. C. 96 A widow cannot adopt except with the authority of her husband.
"A woman cannot adopt in her husband's life-time.
A widow can, without the permission written or verbal, of her deceased husband, adopt anyone she pleases of her husband's male relatives related through males. She cannot adopt anyone else without the consent of her husband's male relatives related through males.
All tribes which adopt except that the Kayasths, Jat Musalman, and Mulah may the widow must either have her husband's express permission to adopt, or the consent of her husband's male relatives.)
The Dhusars say the husband's relatives are either bound to supply the widow with a son, or to allow her to adopt a daughter's son or other relative through a female" (1).
34 P. R. 1907- Kashmiri Pandits. By custom an adoption by a widow without the consent of her deceased husband is valid.
Answer to Question No. 77.':-
"Among Musalman jats a widow cannot adopt, except with the written permission of her husband. Among Pathans, Jat Sikhs, Dogars and Pachadas a widow can in no case adopt, whether the husband Leaves her a written permission or not. In other tribes a widow can adopt if she has either (a) written permission to do so from her husband or (b) obtained his collaterals' consent. In case (a) among Hindu and Musalman Rajputs, Brahmans and Gujjars, the consent of the husband's collaterals is requisite, in addition to his written permission, should the widow adopt from outside her husband's collaterals. If, however, she adopt from among them, the written permission of husband alone is sufficient.
Hindu Rajput widows, however, of Bhiwani town appear not to be bound by these restrictions and to have full power to adopt. In the whole of the Bhiwani Tahsil indeed, among all tribes, widows appear to have greater powers to adopt than elsewhere in the tract."
80 P. R. 1880- By custom the adoption of her husband's nephew by a widow without her husband's consent or of his relatives is not valid. The subsequent consent of some of the heirs to the succession of the adopted son does not supply the lack of the necessary authority.
15 P. R. 1881- Jats. The onus lay on the adopted Son to establish:-
(a) either that the adoption was made with the consent of her husband, or
(b) with the consent of the heirs, or
(c) that she could adopt without the consent of either (a) or (b) and that there exists some special custom to that effect.
An adoption made by the widow herself gives to the adopted son the right to succeed to the widow's own estate only. He has no such right over the estate of her (adopter) husband.
Answer to Question No. 65-
"A widow can only adopt with the verbal or written permission of her husband or with the consent of her husband's collaterals.
Answers to Questions Nos. 89 and 90.-
A woman has no right to adopt.
A widow as such is not authorized to make an adoption.
Answer to Question No. 65.-
"A woman has no right to adopt but with the written consent of her deceased husband or with the consent or his kindred. The Dogras, Gujjars, miscellaneous Mohammedans of the Jullundur Tahsil and Jat Hindus, Mohammedan Rajputs, Kambojs and miscellaneous Mohammedans of tile Nakodar Tahsil say that even verbal content is sufficient. The Sayyads, Sheikhs and Pathans of the Jullundar Tahsil and the Hindu Rajputs and Mahtams of the Nawanshahr Tahsil, however, say that a woman cannot adopt at all 88 P. R. 1881-Mauza Mohabatpur, Nakodar Tahsil. There were two brothers. One of them died and was succeeded by his widow. She adopted her husband's daughter's son as her heir with the consent of the other brother and executed a deed. The widow and the other brother also died. The plaintiff who was the adoptee brought a suit for the possession of the entire estate left by the widow and the other brother; held, that the adoption made with consent of the next reversioner was sufficient to make the plaintiff heir to the estate held by the widow at the time of the adoption and he had no right to succeed to the other brother's estate.
Answer to Question No. 70.-
"A widow can only adopt with the verbal or written permission of her husband or with the consent of her husband's collaterals." Karnal District (Panipat Tahsil and Kamal parganah).
Answer to Question No. 44.-
A widow in no case can merely adopt at her own discretion though if the collaterals consent, she can."
A. I. R. 1923 Lah. 374- Rors of Sutana, Panipat Tahsil. A valid
=76 I. C. 754 custom exists among them by which a widow can adopt a son and that son succeed collaterally. The onus is on the adoptee to establish the custom.
Answer to Question No. 82.
A Woman whose husband is alive cannot adopt at all. If she has inherited from her father she may adopt.
A widow may adopt a son provided she holds a written authority to do so from her husband. She may also adopt with the consent of her husband's collaterals."
23 P. R. 1 876- Khatris. A widow adopted her daughter's son. She also made a gift in his favour. The cousin of her deceased husband contended the adoption. Held, that the adoption was invalid.
182 P. R. 1889- Khokhar Rajputs of Sharakpur Tahsil. A widow is competent to adopt one of her husband's first cousins to the exclusion of another.
C. A. 1314 of 1907- KhokharRajputs. Adoption by a widow in obedience to her husband's unrecorded wish not valid.
* Answer to Question No. 62-
"A woman has practically no right of adoption, and most of the gots of Hindu Jats say that she can adopt under no circumstances, even with the permission of her husband. All Muhammadans (except Rajputs) say that the consent of the collaterals is necessary. In almost every case where the reversioners disputed the adoption. they have succeeded, although there are instances in which adoptions by woman have held good, where the reversioners either gave their consent or did not care to raise an objection."
68 P. R. 1909- Aggarwal Banias of Ludhiana City. An adoption by a widow is not effective without any authority from her husband.
** Answer to Question No.5: Section VI.-
A woman cannot adopt without the permission, written or verbal, of her husband or on his death without the consent of his collaterals." Montgomery District. (Pakpattan & Dipalpur Tahsils).
Answer to Question No. 89.-
(I) Kambojs, Khatris, Mahtams and Qureshis of Tahsil Dipaipur and Arains, Hans, Jat (Muhammadans and Joyas of Tahsil Pakpattan).- A woman can under no circumstances adopt a son.
(2) Sayyads and Aroras of Tahsil Dipalpur say that a woman can adopt during her own life-time if she has got the consent of her husband or his next heirs in writing. The consent of her husband's collaterals is also essential.
(3) Kambojs, Rajput (Muhammadans), Chishtis and all Hindu tribes of Tahsil Pakpattan state the same as No. (2) above.
(4) All other tribes state that they do not observe the custom of adoption.
* Answer to Question No. 89.-
A woman has no right of adoption. She can, however, adopt with the permission of her husband. The permission must be in writing. If it is verbal, it must have been given in the presence of the punchayat. She can always adopt with the consent of her husband's male heirs."
** Answer to Question No. 88.-
"All Mohammedans and Hindus of Muzaffargarh-See the answer
to Question 83.
The Hindus of Leiah and Kot Adu say that a woman has no right of adoption. She can, however, adopt with the permission of her husband. The permission must be in writing. If it is verbal, it must be proved from reliable sources. The Hindus of Alipur assert. that a woman cannot in any case adopt.
*** Answer to Question No 77.
"All tribes admitting adoption throughout except BiJoches, Pathans of Guriani zail in Jhajjar, and Hindu Rajputs of Jhajjar say that a woman cannot adopt in her husband's life-time. She can adopt after his death, provided he gave her written or verbal authority to do so. If she had no such authority she must obtain the consent of his collaterals, whose duty it is to provide her with a suitable boy if she desires to adopt.
Note.-Chief Court civil judgment in Punjab Record 80 of 1880 has ruled that a widow cannot adopt un authorised by her husband or his heirs. Parties were Jats of Gohana Tahsil. pathans of Guriani zail and Biloches say that the authority of the husband given in his life-time is not a valid sanction for the widow to adopt. Hindu Rajputs of Jhajjar say that such authority of her husband, if verbal, is only operative on the thirteenth-day ceremony after death, and not later.
**** Answer to Question No.5, Sec. IV-
"A woman cannot adopt either in her husband's life-time or after his death except with the written permission of her husband or of his agnate heirs, unless where there are no near agnate heirs."
*****Answer to Question No. 67-
"A widow cannot adopt unless she has first obtained the verbal or written permission of her husband or the consent of his collaterals after his death.
Note-While this is the general answer there is a strong body of opinion to the effect that a woman can only adopt one of her husband's collaterals while many deny her right to adopt in any circumstances.
Sirsa District (old).
(a) A woman cannot adopt in her husband's life-time. A widow can without the permission. written or verbal. of her deceased husband adopt a son with the consent of her husband's agnates, who will succeed to her deceased husband's estate Rains.
(b) A woman cannot adopt in her husband's life-time. A widow can without the permission, written or verbal. of her deceased husband. Adopt anyone she pleases of her husband's near agnates. She cannot adopt any one else without the consent of her husband's agnates. (All Hindu tribes, except Banya, Rora, Brahman).
The Same except that either the permission, written or verbal. of her deceased husband or the consent of his agnates, seems necessary. (Banya. Rora, Brahman).
Note.-This custom practically gives the sonless widow the power of gifting whole of her deceased husband's estate to one agnate nephew, to the exclusion of all the other nephews.
(17) Adoption by a widow with authorization of husband. As has already been stated above, according to the custom generally prevailing in the Punjab, a widow cannot appoint or adopt an heir to her husband unless she has been expressly authorized by her husband to do so or has obtained the consent of her husband's kindred (I). Instances of exceptions to this rule also have been referred to above (2). It is not essential that the husband's authorization should be in writing; nor need it specify the name of the heir (3). 'When a particular person is specified in the authorization the widow is ordinarily bound to appoint him and no other. But on his death, in the absence of any restriction by the husband to the contrary, she may appoint another' (4).
Where a widow has by law or custom a power to adopt, the fact that she has succeeded to her deceased husband's estate. not as his direct heir, but as heir to her son, makes no difference in her power, and a sunless mother continues to have the same power of adoption as she would have had if her husband' had died childless son.
But an authority to adopt is exhausted if the prior adopted son dies leaving a widow (6).
Where the husband has more than one wife he may select anyone of his wives to make the adoption or appointment, and the one so selected alone becomes under Hindu Law entitled to succeed the adopted Son in the event of his death without issue or nearer heirs (7).
"A widow cannot be compelled to exercise her power of appointment, nor does she forfeit her life-interest by not exercising it (l).
The power may be exercised at any time (2).
But the widow cannot exercise it so as to defeat the heirs of a subsequent male-holder who are in possession with full rights (3).
Where a Hindu gave a power of adoption to his wife, directing that so long as the wife should live she should remain in possession of all his property, moveable and immovable, it was held that the widow took only a life-interest in her deceased husband's property with remainder to the adopted son (4).
(20) Adoption by a widow with the consent of reversioners. A widow generally can also adopt with the consent of the reversioners. Such a consent, however, must be proved to be customary and is not to be presumed to exist (6).
Consent of kinsmen, where permitted. may be presumed, (a) from long acquiescence, (b) from publicity of appointment without objection, or (c) from subsequent ratification (7).
In every such case, however, there must be such proof of consent on the part of the kindred as is sufficient to support the inference that the act is done by the widow, not from capricious or corrupt motives, or in order to defeat a particular reversionary heir, but upon a fair consideration, by what may be called a family council, of the expediency of substituting an heir by appointment to the deceased husband (8), The presumption is, until the contrary is shown, that the widow has acted from proper motives in making the adoption (9). The subsequent consent of some of the reversioners to the succession of the adopted son, does not supply the want of the necessary authority to adopt In the first Instance (10). In the case of the husband leaving a brother only, his consent is sufficient (11).
The mere assent of the immediate reversioner does not necessarily bind the more remote reversioners who may become entitled to succeed the widow owing to the prior death of the former (12). In Nathu v. Rahman (13) it was held that the acquiescence by a sonless near reversioner (brother of the deceased) and his consent in the alienation did not bind the next reversioners.
In Phera v. Ball1(I), however, a case the parties to which were zargars of a village in the Hoshiarpur Tahsil, it was held that the adoption of a daughter's son, which had been acquiesced in by one of the heirs and was backed by the express assent of the eldest living member of the family was valid by custom.
The proprietors of the patti of the village in which the deceased husband had his land are not, as such, and in the presence of near reversioners, entitled to sue to contest an appointment of an heir (2).
In the case of an undivided Hindu family the assent of those kinsmen of the deceased husband is requisite who are liable to support the widow during her widowhood, and to defray the marriage expenses of her female issue (3).
In 1918, 40 All. 593 (P. C.), a widow adopted a son, professing to do so under all authority given by her deceased husband. Litigation followed and there arose a question as to the factum and validity of the adoption. The widow and the adopted son both pleaded that the latter had been validly adopted by the former under the authority of her husband.
This plea was held to be proved by the Courts. It appears that later the widow and tile adopted son quarrelled with each other, and consequently the lady filed a suit for a declaration that the latter had not been validly adopted by her. She alleged that she had no authority to adopt from her husband and that she did not as a fact make the adoption. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that under such circumstances the widow was estopped from denying that she had the authority of her husband to adopt or that the adoptee was validly adopted by her.
This case was distinguished in Shiwala M ahadeo Dandishwar Maharaj v. Lachman (4). In this case on Dewa executed a deed of adoption in favour of Lachman on the 23rd November 1923. On the 28th March 1924 he gifted 38 bighas of land in favour of the appellant, Shiwala lvIalladeo Dlndishwar Maharaj. Lacbman, who was a minor, thereupon instituted a suit to set aside the gift. Dewa was also impleaded as a defendant. The plea of the defendants was that the plaintiff had not been adopted and that the deed of adoption was merely a paper transaction. The performance of any ceremonies of adoption was denied. It was held that the executant of a document was not necessarily estopped from denying the facts stated therein but the burden of proving the non-existence of such facts was on him. The circumstance that the Government as The ruling power is entitled to escheat will not render an alienation by a widow invalid (5).
47. MINOR ADOPTION BY-:
A Hindu minor may adopt an heir, and amongst the agriculture classes he may also with the constant of his nearest male kindred make a customary appointment of an heir.
Vol. II, Maca. Precedellts 180; 15 W. R. 548; I. L. R. 1 Cal. 289
(P. C.); and V Cal. Reps. 380; I. L. R. XVII Cal. 69.
EFFECT OF ADOPTION ON SUCCESSION
48. RIGHT IN NATURAL FAMILY -:
An heir appointed in the manner above described ordinarily does not thereby lose his right to succeed to property in his natural family, as against collaterals, but does not succeed in the presence of his natural brothers.
Article 48 originally stood as follows :-
"An hair appointed in the manner above described does not thereby ordinarily lose his right to succeed to property in his natural family, at least as against collaterals."
It was altered into its present form by Sir Henry Rattigan in the eighth (1914) edition].
49. COLLATERALS SUCCESSION -:
Nor, on the other hand, does the heir acquire a right to succeed to the collateral relatives on the person who appoints him, where no formal adoption has taken place, inasmuch as the relationship established between him and the appointer is a purely personal one.
50. Relinquishing status.
He cannot, however, relinquish his status.
51. ADOPTION IRREVOCABLE -:
Nor can he be disinherited for misconduct, disobedience, or neglect to support his adopted or quasi adopted father; nor can the latter subsequently revoke or repudiate the adoption or appointment once lawfully made. Provided that the appointed heir (or his guardian) may waive his right of immediate succession in favour of the widow who appoints him. Provided also that the deceased husband may qualify the power of appointment with a condition that the son appointed by his widow shall not succeed until after her death, and the heir appointed under the power will be bound by such condition.
The customary appointment of an heir in the Punjab resembles in many respects, in its incidents, the Kritrima form of adoption of Hindu Law, which also has no connection with religious ideas, and is wholly non-Brahmanical. "A Kritrima adoption does not transfer the subject of it from his natural family. It gives him, in addition to his rights in that family, rights of inheritance to the person actually adopting him and to no one else. His sons acquire no rights of inheritance to his adoptive father." (Trevelyan's Hindu Law). "As regards succession, the Kritrima son loses no rights of inheritance in his natural family. He becomes th6 son of two fathers to this extent, that he takes the inheritance of his adoptive father, but not of that father's father, or other collateral relations Nor do his sons take any interest in the property of the adoptive father, the relationship between adopter and adoptee being limited to the contracting parties themselves and hot extending further on either side." (Mayne's Hindu Law, 7th ed., p. 266).
The customary appointment of an heir resembles in many respects the Kritrima form of adoption of Hindu Law, and as regards the Kritrima son, it has been held that he does not succeed to the property of his adoptive father's father, nor do his sons take the inheritance of his adoptive father (1).
But it must not be understood that Kritrima adoptions and customary adoptions in the Punjab are identical. As observed by Sir Meredyth Plowden in 147 P. R. 1889, after discussing some of the points of similarity, 'Adoption of adults being common in the Punjab, and not being admissible under the Dattaka form, it has been inferred that the. Krilrima form prevails here, whereas the truth probably is that neither form prevails, and that adoptions among agriculturists are generally informal and customary adoptions.' Similarly, Chatterji remarked in Sohnun v. Ram Dial (2)-'It is difficult, therefore, merely, on the ground of certain similarities between Kritrima adoptions and customary adoptions in this province to say that they are identical.
The similarities between the kritrima and customary forms of adoption do not extend beyond certain points, e.g., the non-existence of the fiction of affiliation, or restrictions regarding the person to be appointed, and particular religious ceremonies being unnecessary. But while consent of adoptee is essential in "Kritrima" adoptions, and the relationship is confined to the adopted son, and does not extend even to the latter's wife, in customary adoptions, though there is no restriction of age, adoption of infants is the rule, and the child is generally given by the parents and the relationship certainly extends to the husband or wife of the person adopting (1).
The following observations of Tek Chand, J. in Kanshi Ram v. Situ (2) are worth perusal-"Mr. drew our attention to certain remarks in some reported Judgments, where the customary appointment of an heir is described as resembling the Kritrima form of adoption under the Hindu Law, and argued that as a Kritrima son does not lose his right to succeed to his natural father or brothers, the same rule should be held applicable to persons who are "appointed heirs" under the Punjab Customary Law. This argument however is entirely fallacious, and appears to be based on misconception of the real nature and incidents of the Kritrima adoption.
This form of adoption prevails generally in Bihar and the adjoining country, and possesses some very peculiar features which are entirely absent in the customary appointment of an heir in the Punjab. For instance, it is necessary for the validity of a Kritrima adoption that the adopted son must consent to his adoption-the essential ceremony consisting of a statement by the adopter 'Be thou my son' and the reply by 'the adoptee will become your son.. It is hardly necessary to point out that the consent of the appointee is not at all required under Punjab custom. Again, in Kritrima adoptions there is no bar to the adoption of a daughter's Son or sister's son, but in the Punjab (unless a special custom to the contrary is proved the daughter's son or sister's son cannot be adopted. Another peculiar feature of Kritrima adoptions is that a wife can adopt a son to herself even though the husband has already adopted a son to himself. Such double adoptions are, of course, entirely unknown in the Punjab.
There are several other points of dissimilarity, but it does not appear necessary to discuss them here. It will be sufficient to say that the two systems are fundamentally different, and while there are some points of resemblance, all the incidents of one cannot be imported by analogy into the other. Following page 154 of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law, 11th Edition, Tapp, J. in Indar Singh v. Mst. Gurdevi (3) stated that the customary appointment of an heir in the Punjab... .resembles -in many respects in its incidents the Kritrima form of a ioption in Hindu Law. In the Kritrima form of adoption the adoptee loses no rights of inheritance in his natural father's family and there is no transplanting as in the Dattaka form of adoption-
It has been repeatedly laid down that the customary appointment of 'In heir does not involve the transplanting of the heir from one family to another. The tie of kinship with the natural family is not dissolved and the fiction of blood relationship with the members of the new family has no application to the appointed heir. Tile relationship established between the appointer and the appointee is a purely personal one and does not extend beyond the contracting parties on either side (1).
In Mehra v. .tl1angal Singh (2) one Mebra brought a suit for possession of a plot of land sold by his father, Jawala, to the defendants in 1898. Jawala had been appointed an heir by one Amir and obtained the land in dispute in his capacity as the latter's heir. It was admitted that the plaintiff was born s1;l.bsequent to the appointment of Jawala as heir of Amir.
On these facts the Courts below held that the land in the bands of Jawala was not ancestral qua the plaintiff, and that the latter had no locus standi to impeach the alienation. On further appeal, it was held that the Son of an appointee. whether born before or after the appointment of his father, was incompetent to contest an alienation by the latter of the property received from the appointer. It was observed in this case-"It must be remembered that we are not here dealing with a ceremonial adoption of Hindu Law in which the adopted son is completely transferred from his natural family and becomes a part and parcel of the adoptive family in the same way as if he were a natural born son. But in the case of the customary appointment of an heir it has been repeatedly held that it does not involve the transplanting of a person from one family to another. The tie of kinship with the natural family is not dissolved and the fiction of blood relationship with the members of the new family has no application to the appointed heir. The relationship established between the appointer and the appointee is purely personal one and does not extend beyond the contracting parties on their side vide inter alia, Wazira v. Kahn a (3). It follows that the appointer or his male lineal ascendant cannot be called an ancestor of the appointee's son.
As regards the appointee's right to property, it is clear that he does not ordinarily lose his right of succession in his natural family and any property which he inherits from his natural father or any other male lineal ascendant would undoubtedly be ancestral qua his sons, and the latter are entitled to set aside an improper alienation of that property made by their father. But the same thing cannot be predicated with respect to the estate which the appointed heir receives from the appointer. If the estate consists of the self-acquired property of the latter, then the appointee becomes an absolute owner of it and has plenary power of disposal over it. If, on the other hand, the estate consists of property over which the appointer had only a restricted power, then the appointed heir takes it subject to the residuary interest which resides in the appointer's reversioners. The property having descended from a common ancestor of the appointer and his reversioners, the latter have the same right of objecting to an alienation made by the appointee as they possessed with respect to an alienation by the appointer. As regards them the property continues to be ancestral and they can protect their reversionary rights by vetoing an improper alienation: vide Silo Ram v.1Raja Ram (1). But we do not think that property, whether ancestral or self-acquired, of the ap- pointer, received by the appointed heir, can be regarded as ancestral the latter's sons,"
In Uggar Sen v. Khushi Ram (2) it has been held that adoption of a daughter's son cannot be in the dattaka form and consequently there is no transplantation of the adoptee into the adopter's family and so as no relationship is created by the adoption beyond the personal relationship of the parties, the adopter's daughters cannot be held to become the sisters of the doptee.
In Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Singh (3) (a case relating to Jullundur District) also it was observed that an adoption amongst agriculturists of the Punjab generally partakes of the nature of the Kritrima adoption of the Hindu law and creates merely a personal relationship between the adopter and the adoptee. It does not transplant the adoptee completely from his natural family into the adopter's family. The adoptee does no I become the grandson of the adopter's father's father and the adopter' son does not become the grandson of the former's adoptive father. It is however, quite possible even for an agriculturist to make an adoption manifesting an intention to make a complete change of the family. In such a case the adoption may well be regarded as having more extensive implications than an ordinary customary adoption or appointment.
It was further observed that there is nothing in the Customary Law of the District of Jullundur which may give rise to an inference that a person adopted otherwise than by means of a formal adoption amongst agriculturists becomes completely transplanted from the natural family into the adoptive family. It does not recognize the right of an adopted son to succeed collaterally in the adoptive family.
Similarly, it was observed in FazalHaq v. Mst. Said Nur (4) that a son adopted under custom is not a cognate because a customary appointment as an heir creates merely a personal relationship between the appointer and the appointee and does not make the latter a descendant of any of the ancestors of the former.
In lnder v. Mukhtar (5) it was held that amongst agricultural tribes of the Punjab, adoption' is in no sense connected with religion and is a purely secular arrangement resorted to by a sonless owner of land in order to nominate a person to succeed him as his heir. The object of such an adoption is not to secure any religious benefit for the sons of the adopter but to obtain a practical and temporal benefit. During his lifetime the adopter secures the assistance of the appointed heir in cultivation and after his death the appointed heir inherits the estate of his adoptive father to the exclusion of the adoptive father's collaterals. The mere performance of certain rites relating to adoption under Hindu law would not convert the customary appointment of an heir of Hindu Jat of the Ludhiana District into a formal adoption under Hindu law.